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ABSTRACT 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) are renewable electricity (RES-E) 
subsidy mechanisms in which governments mandate how much RES-E should be 
generated and markets determine the cost of the subsidy needed to generate the 
RES-E. Two modifications of the RPS that can help support high-cost types of 
RES-E are banding, where governments mandate higher multiples of RPS tradable 
certificates for high-cost types of RES-E, and carve-outs, where governments 
prescribe a part of an RPS target that can be met only by a particular type, or types, 
of RES-E. 
 This paper analyses the design and generation performance of banding, as 
used in the UK, with some reference to Italy; and carve-outs, as used in the USA. 
To date, there is insufficient experience of either device to reach firm conclusions 
about their generation effectiveness. However, there is early, tentative evidence that 
banding is successful at supporting high-cost types of RES-E in the UK. Carve-outs 
are not being fully exploited in US states that use an RPS mechanism, and Italy is 
using banding in a fairly insignificant way. Though both devices have different 
design strengths and weaknesses, and either could be adapted to specific RPS 
markets, banding is probably the better device for supporting high-cost RES-E.  
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Abbreviated title: ‘Carve-out and banding effectiveness’ 
 
 1. Introduction 
Renewable electricity (RES-E) is assuming increasing policy importance 
around the world because it is considered a significant means by which greenhouse 
gas emissions can be reduced (Mendonca et al., 2010). However, RES-E currently 
generally costs more to generate than electricity generated by fossil fuels without a 
carbon price (although this can depend on the technology in question and the site 
where RES-E is located). Several different support mechanisms have evolved that 
subsidise RES-E so that it can overcome its generation cost disadvantage with fossil 
fuel generated electricity. Two of the most popular use subsidies financed by 
electricity consumers. They are: Feed-in Tariffs (FITs), in which governments 
mandate a level of subsidy and markets determine how much RES-E is generated; 
and Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs), in which governments mandate how 
much RES-E is generated and markets determine the price it is to generated for 
(either through the spot market trade of RES-E generation certificates or through 
contracted certificate trade) (Finon, 2006). FITs are generally differentiated  and 
therefore pay a different subsidy per unit of generation of different types of RES-E 
(ie wind, solar, biomass etc)  whereas RPSs are generally not differentiated and 
pay the same subsidy regardless of RES-E type. 
 Because RPSs are generally undifferentiated, they support low-cost types of 
RES-E and give no incentive for high-cost types of RES-E to be purchased. 
However, as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions assumes increasing 
importance, the RPS mechanism is being called upon to support the full range of 
RES-E types, including high-cost types. This is because high-cost RES-E types 
often have significant generating potential which will need to be developed if a 
large proportion of a country’s electricity is to be generated by RES-E. Examples 
are offshore wind in the United Kingdom and solar in Australia (Secretary for 
Energy and Climate Change, 2009, p. 44; Garnaut, 2008, p. 486). This article 
discusses and analyses two RPS design devices that can allow this to happen: 
banding and carve-outs. Banding is a device in which different multiples of tradable 
certificates are issued for each unit of generation depending on the type of RES-E. 
Carve-outs are parts of an RPS market that are reserved for particular RES-E types: 
they are, effectively, RPS submarkets. 
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  Several authors have compared the RPS mechanism to the FIT one (Mitchell 
et al., 2006; Butler and Neuhoff, 2004; Toke, 2005) while others have analysed a 
country, or group of countries, that use RPS mechanisms (Van der Linden et al, 
2005; Kaberger et al., 2007). Others, still, have considered particular aspects of RPS 
design (Agnolucci, 2007; Kildegaard, 2008). However, none have compared the 
effectiveness of banding and carve-outs. 
 Section two of this paper discusses the evolution, and global use, of the RPS 
mechanism; section three discusses the strengths and weaknesses of an 
undifferentiated RPS. Section four analyses the use of banding in the United 
Kingdom and Italy while section five analyses the use of carve-outs in the United 
States of America. Section six compares the strengths and weaknesses of banding 
and carve-outs, and section seven concludes. 
2. History and use of the RPS 
The RPS was originally developed in the USA in the late 1990s: about ten 
years after the FIT was established. As shown in Table 1, the RPS is less 
extensively used around the world than the FIT, especially at a national level. The 
RPS is popular in North America while the FIT is extensively used in Europe. 
Neither the RPS, nor the FIT, is widely used outside those two continents although 
there is limited use of both in Asia and some use of the FIT in Africa and 
Central/South America. 
Compulsory RPS mechanisms have been adopted by half of the states in the 
USA as well as by the District of Columbia. They have also been adopted by three 
of the 13 provinces and territories of Canada; are deployed in Belgium, Italy, 
Sweden, the UK, Romania and Poland; are used in Japan, Thailand and Australia; 
and have been used in six states in India. 
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 Table 1: RPS and FIT jurisdictions around the world, 2008 
Region No. of 
countries 
using an 
RPS 
No. of sub-
national 
governments 
using an 
RPS 
No. of 
countries 
using an FIT 
No. of sub-
national 
governments 
using an FIT 
Europe 5 0 28 0 
North America 0 27 0 3 
Central and South 
America 
1 0 5 0 
Asia 3 5 6 12 
Middle East 0 0 1 0 
Pacific 1 0 0 5 
Africa 0 0 3 0 
Total 10 32 43 20 
Source: Renewable Energy Policy Network, 2009; Wiser and Barbose, 2008. 
The RPS mechanism generally involves an obligation on electricity retailers to 
purchase a government pre-determined proportion of their sales as RES-E, either 
directly from RES-E generators via contracts, or indirectly via RES-E open market 
tradable certificate sales (which typically represent one megawatt-hour of RES-E 
generation). The organisation that did the most to develop the RPS was the 
American Wind Energy Association (AWEA). It wanted a mechanism that was 
compatible with deregulated electricity markets. It also wanted a mechanism that 
would be acceptable to the US Congress which, in the late 1990s, was dominated by 
the Republican Party. The FIT was not considered politically acceptable in the USA 
at the time. The 1995 commencement of trading of sulphur-dioxide emission 
licenses under quantity-based rules enshrined in the nation’s Clean Air Act  the 
predecessor of greenhouse gas emissions trading widely viewed in the US as a cost-
effective way of reducing sulphur-dioxide emissions  also influenced the US 
renewable energy political landscape of the time (Wood, 2007, p. 2). The AWEA 
official most credited with developing the mechanism, Nancy Rader, argued that 
‘the flexible, market-based implementation of the standard would ensure 
achievement of policy goals at least cost’ (Rader and Norgaard, 1996, p. 44).  
3. Strengths and weaknesses of an RPS 
Particularly when compared to the FIT, the big advantage of an RPS 
mechanism is its theoretical ability to contain RES-E subsidy costs. This is achieved 
through its dictation of the quantity of RES-E that is to provided, as well as through 
its incentive to source least-cost types of RES-E. Menanteau et al (2003, p. 810) 
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 argue that quantity based systems like an RPS give governments direct control over 
the amount of installed RES-E capacity and, therefore indirectly, over the marginal 
cost of RES-E production. Finon (2006, p. 331) similarly argues that one of the 
strengths of an RPS is the possibility it provides for the control of collective subsidy 
costs. This theoretical ability to contain subsidy costs means that RPS mechanisms 
have a high static efficiency: the ability to contain short-term costs without regard 
for longer term cost consequences. It is also argued that the use of non-compliance 
penalties  fees imposed when electricity retailers do not purchase the required 
amount of RES-E  further enhance the static efficiency advantage of an RPS 
(Finon, 2006, p. 331). Other theoretical strengths of an RPS include the fact that 
through allowing all RES-E generators, and all electricity retailers, to buy and sell 
into the same market they are better than FITs at allocating marginal generation 
costs across a market (Menanteau et al, 2003, p. 803). A further theoretical strength 
is that, because the RPS is a mechanism that assumes a separation between RES-E 
production and consumption, is better suited to unbundled liberalised electricity 
markets where generators and distributors are not vertically integrated (Finon, 2006, 
p. 328; Menanteau et al, 2003, p. 809). 
However, the theoretical strengths of an RPS are challenged by many 
commentators. While the RPS may have a theoretical cost containment/static 
efficiency advantage over an FIT, many argue this advantage is more than 
outweighed by the risk premium that RES-E generators demand in an RPS market. 
The risk premium is a product of RPS tradable certificates trading for uncertain, and 
potentially volatile, prices which reduces the ability of an RES-E investor to attract 
loan finance which they compensate for by selling generation certificates at a 
premium (Menanteau et al, 2003, p. 810; Finon, 2006, p. 332). The existence of this 
risk premium led Butler and Neuhoff (2004, p. 13) to conclude that, over the 
lifetime of a wind generator, the resource adjusted cost of the FIT subsidy it 
attracted in Germany was less than the equivalent RPS subsidy extended to a 
generator in the UK. Toke (2005, p. 30) also concluded that there was no evidence 
that the UK RPS supplies RES-E less expensively than an FIT. Similarly, Mitchell 
et al (2006, p. 304) argued that, although FITs and RPSs had similar volume risks, 
RPSs had higher price risks.  
A second major criticism of the RPS holds that because it only incentivises 
least-cost RES-E, it lacks dynamic efficiency: the reduction of long-run marginal 
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 costs through the development of less mature RES-E types (Finon, 2006, p. 318; 
Menanteau et al, 2003, p. 805; Jaffe et al., 2005). As shown in Table 2, the 
generating costs of solar photovoltaic, solar thermal and offshore wind are currently 
much higher than those of onshore wind and biomass using steam, so any 
mechanism, like an RPS, that is focused on the subsidisation of least-cost RES-E 
types will not provide much support to them. This criticism of the RPS is sometimes 
extended through an argument that says that not only does the RPS only incentivise 
least-cost RES-E, but because, in undifferentiated form, it provides a homogeneous 
subsidy to all types of RES-E, it tends to oversubsidise mature, least-cost types of 
RES-E whilst undersubsidising less mature, high-cost types of RES-E (Toke, 2007, 
p. 283). 
Table 2: 2005 generating costs of RES-E. 
RElec technology Generating cost: US$/MWh 
Onshore wind $40 - $90 
Biomass $30 - $120 
Geothermal $40 - $100 
Ocean $80- $400 
Solar thermal $120 to $450 
Solar photovoltaic $250 to $1600 
Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, p. 293. 
As climate change awareness has grown, the inability of the RPS to support a 
wide range of RES-E types has been increasingly seen as a significant weakness of 
the mechanism. In 2008, the United Kingdom government (which began using an 
RPS in 2002, called the ‘Renewables Obligation’ (RO)) said: ‘We acknowledge that 
in the past the overall effectiveness of the RO has been hampered by the fact that it 
did not incentivise a sufficiently wide range of technologies’ (Department for 
Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008a, p. 91). Governments that have 
tried to address the dynamic efficiency weakness of the RPS mechanism have either 
opted to use another mechanism to support high-cost types of RES-E, like an FIT or 
budget financed subsidies, or have redesigned their RPSs so that they include 
banding or carve-outs. Amongst governments that have redesigned their RPS 
mechanisms, carve-outs tend to be preferred in North America while banding tends 
to be preferred in Europe. 
 
 
page 6 
 4. The use of banding in the United Kingdom and Italy 
 Examination of the experience of banding in particular countries is instructive; 
two countries that have attempted to make significant use of the device are the United 
Kingdom and Italy. 
4.1 The use of banding in the United Kingdom  
The country that has most enthusiastically embraced RPS banding is the 
United Kingdom. After extensive public consultation, in April 2009 it introduced 
the banding tradable certificate multipliers shown in Table 3 (although, when 
originally announced, the offshore wind multiplier was 1.5, not 2). In April 2010 it 
also introduced an FIT for small scaled RES-E generation of less than 5 MW 
capacity (which cannot also be subsidised through the RPS). As shown in Table 3, 
emerging and post-demonstration RES-E types receive more tradable certificates 
per unit of generation than referenced and established types. However, RPS banding 
in the UK may end up having a relatively short life: in December 2010 the country’s 
Department of Energy and Climate Change released a consultation document on 
possible electricity market reforms in which it stated that the government’s 
‘preferred package’ of reforms included a premium based FIT which it argued was 
the type of RES-E support mechanism that would work most effectively with its 
current greenhouse gas emissions trading system (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change, 2010c, p. 111). 
Table 3: UK RPS banding rates, 2009. 
RES-E type Banding 
multipliers 
(tradable 
certificates per 
MWh) 
UK government 
classification of 
RES-E type 
Landfill gas 0.25 Established 
Sewage and biomass cofiring 0.5 Established 
Onshore wind, hydro, other cofiring 1.0 Reference 
Regular biomass 1.5 Post-demonstration 
Offshore wind, dedicated biomass 2.0 Post-demonstration 
Wave, solar PV, geothermal 2.0 Emerging 
Source: Enviros, 2009; Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008a and 2008b. 
The UK banding rates were mainly based on short and medium term RES-E 
generating costs calculated by Ernst and Young (2007). However, the offshore wind 
rate was revised after new generating cost projections were made for that type of 
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 RES-E by Ernst and Young in 2009 and a new sewage and co-firing band was 
introduced after public consultation on the originally proposed banding rates 
(Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008b). When setting 
the banding rates, the UK government made it clear that it was not its intention ‘to 
provide all projects with exactly the support level they need’. It argued that doing so 
would not necessarily incentivise RES-E developers or recognise the future limits of 
the resources some RES-E types rely on (Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, 2008a, p. 8). For most types of RES-E, the new tradable 
certificate multipliers applied to generators who received accreditation after the 
banding device was foreshadowed in July 2006. RES-E generators accredited before 
that time were grandfathered with one tradable certificate per MWh of generation, 
except for biomass and mixed waste generators which received banded certificate 
rates regardless of when they were established (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, 2008, pp. 17 – 20). 
Under an RPS, RES-E generators derive their income from two sources: the 
wholesale price of electricity, which all electricity generators receive, and the sale 
of tradable certificates (by contract or on spot market), that only RES-E generators 
receive. This means RPS tradable certificates cover the part of RES-E generating 
costs that is not covered by the wholesale price of electricity. Table 4 therefore 
shows the 2006 (or 2009 in the case of offshore wind) RES-E generating costs 
determined by Ernst and Young, as well as their projected 2020 generating costs, 
less the average wholesale price of electricity in the UK in the first quarter of 2009 
(£47/MWh). It also shows the relationship of those net generating costs to the net 
generating cost of the reference large onshore wind and how that relationship 
compares to that of the different tradable certificate multiplier rates compared to 
large onshore wind’s. 
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 Table 4: Current and future estimated RES-E generating costs of selected 
RES-E types and relationship to their United Kingdom 2009 banding rates. 
 
RES-E type 2006 or 2009 
medium levelised 
generating cost 
less wholesale 
price of 
electricity: 
£/MWh (2007 or 
2009 £)(1) 
Ratio of 2006 
RES-E 
generating 
cost to 2006 
large onshore 
wind 
generating 
cost (2) 
2020 medium 
levelised 
generating 
cost less 
wholesale 
price of 
electricity: 
£/MWh (2007 
£)(3) 
Ratio of 2020 
RES-E 
generating 
cost to 2020 
large onshore 
wind 
generating 
cost (4) 
2009 tradable 
certificate 
multiplier 
rates (tradable 
certificates per 
MWh of 
generation)(5) 
Sewage gas 16.1 0.77 16.1 0.83 0.5 
Landfill gas 1 0.05 1 0.05 0.25 
Large onshore 
wind (high and low 
wind average) 
 
21 
 
1.0 
 
19.5 
 
1.0 
 
1.0 
Regular biomass                 43                  2.05                 48                  2.46                    1.5 
Offshore wind 97 4.62 38 1.95 2.0 
Tidal 134 6.38 90 4.62 2.0 
Wave 152 7.24 104 5.33 2.0 
Solar PV 588 28.0 397 20.36 2.0 
Source: Ernst and Young, 2007, (cols. 1 and 3); Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 
2008a, (cols. 1, 3 and 5); Ernst and Young, 2009, (cols. 1 and 3); author’s calculations, (cols. 2 and 4). 
The author calculations in Table 4 show that for all non onshore wind types of 
RES-E, apart from landfill gas, the ratio of its banding rate to that of onshore wind 
is lower than the ratio of its 2007 (or 2009) net generating cost to onshore wind’s. 
When it comes to net 2020 generating costs, the ratio of banding rates to onshore 
wind’s is still lower than that of net generating costs for all RES-E types apart from 
landfill gas and offshore wind. Those two RES-E types are therefore the ones that 
the UK’s banding is most generous to. The poor relationship of the banding rates of 
the other RES-E types, when compared to net generating costs, especially solar 
PV’s, is probably a product of the UK government wanting to create an ongoing 
incentive to develop decreasing generating costs for those RES-E types, as well as a 
possible fear that a high banding rate would make the scheme very costly. It may 
also reflect a prediction that most solar PV generators, and some generators of the 
other RES-E types, will elect to be subsidised under a new FIT for generators up to 
5 MW in capacity that began in April 2010. 
It is clear from Table 4 that the projection of RES-E generating costs by 
governments is pivotal to the effectiveness of banding. It could be argued that this 
introduces a significant level of risk into the mechanism and that poor cost 
projections could make banding impotent, or overly generous, to some RES-E 
types. However, it has to be remembered that undifferentiated RPS markets are 
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 overly generous to some RES-E types whilst not being generous enough to others. 
Toke (2007, p. 283), for instance, argues that because RPS mechanisms have a 
homogenised tradable certificate price, they tend to oversubsidise mature, 
inexpensive RES-E types while undersubsidising more expensive types. This means 
that, if well constructed, a banded RPS can more closely align tradable certificate 
creation with RES-E generating cost relativities compared to an undifferentiated 
RPS, but it could also mean that a poorly constructed banded RPS could make them 
less well aligned. 
 The adoption of RPS banding was a major policy change for the UK 
government; as recently as 2001 it had declared that ‘banding would be too rigid an 
approach for a long-term policy such as the [Renewables] Obligation, and would 
require the Government to dictate the contribution of each energy source. This 
approach would be contrary to the market-led basis of the Obligation’ (Department 
of Trade and Industry, 2001, p. 26). This was despite the fact that extensive public 
consultation, held before its RPS was introduced, supported the introduction of 
banding (Foxon and Pearson, 2007, p. 1543). The government’s change from an 
unbanded RPS was largely prompted by its desire to support significantly more 
wind generation, particularly offshore wind. The UK government has an official 
RES-E target of a 20% share of all electricity generation by 2020, although it has 
only set interim targets through to 2015-16 (the target for that year is 15.4%) 
(Mitchell et al, 2011). However, as part of a European Union goal of sourcing 20% 
of all energy use (electricity, heat and transport) from renewable sources by 2020, it 
is committed to sourcing 15% of all its energy from renewable sources by 2020. In 
order to comply with this, there is an unofficial aspiration to source 30% of the 
country’s electricity from RES-E by 2020 about 70% of which the government 
hopes will be generated by wind (both onshore and offshore) and about a third of 
which it hopes will be generated by offshore wind (Secretary for Energy and 
Climate Change, 2009, pp. 44, 52). In 2007 the UK sourced 5.1% of its electricity 
from RES-E (European Commission, 2010).  
Table 5 shows the change in the RES-E generation covered by the UK RPS 
between 2006, when banding was announced, and 2009, the year when it 
commenced. The largest increases in generation were recorded by offshore wind, 
onshore wind and biomass. Of these, offshore wind and biomass are the standouts 
because onshore wind did not receive any increase in tradable certificates per unit of 
page 10 
 generation under banding. So while there is too little significant data to say 
definitively say how successful the UK’s banding has been at putting the country on 
a path to achieving its ambitious unofficial 2020 RES-E generation goal, the Table 5 
results suggest a credible start has been made. It should be noted that solar PV in the 
UK during the 2006 to 2009 period was assisted through a government grants 
program and its RPS was not necessarily the key driver of its increased generation. 
Also worthy of note is that co-firing is limited to a maximum of 12.5% of the 
generation accounted for by the UK’s RPS (Mitchell et al, 2011). 
 
Table 5: Change in RES-E generation under United Kingdom RPS,  
2006-07 and 2009-10 
 
RES-E type 2006-07 
generation: 
GWh/yr  
2009-10 
generation: 
GWh/yr  
2006-07 to  
2009-10 
change 
Hydro 2,447 2,614 +7% 
Landfill gas        4,424             4,952             +12% 
Sewage 447 638 +43% 
Co-firing 2,528 1,806 -29% 
Biomass 797 1,729 +117% 
Offshore wind 651 1,740 +167% 
Onshore wind 3,574 7,564 +111% 
Solar PV 11 20 +82% 
Total 14,879 21,063 +42% 
RES-E diversity index 4.81 4.51 -7% 
 
Source: Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010b. 
 
Table 5 includes an RES-E diversity index for 2006-07 and 2009-10. The 
indexes are computed using an inverted Herfindahl index: the sum of the squares of 
the shares of RES-E generation of each RES-E type in a jurisdiction in a given year. 
The higher the diversity index, the less concentrated is the overall mix of RES-E 
types. The RES-E diversity index fell, slightly, in the UK over the period as its 
RES-E generation became more concentrated around hydro, landfill gas and 
onshore wind but the index will rise if offshore wind generation continues to 
increase. The UK’s RES-E generation is more diverse than that of Italy, shown in 
Table 9, and US carve-out and non carve-out RPS states, shown in Table 14. 
However, its commencing RES-E diversity in 2006-07 was already significantly 
more diverse than that of US carve-out and non carve-out RPS states in 2003, and 
Italy in 2008. 
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 The UK has a complicated non-compliance charge mechanism that, to date, 
has had a major negative effect on the attainment of its RPS targets that may 
significantly affect the success of its banding. The country’s non-compliance charge 
was £36.99/MWh in 2009/10. The charge, known as a ‘buyout fee’, is recycled 
amongst complying electricity retailers. When combined with the high degree of 
ownership concentration in the UK electricity industry, it is often argued this 
recycling gives the industry an incentive to under-invest in new RES-E capacity. 
This happens through the highly concentrated UK RES-E generators restricting the 
supply of RES-E, thereby keeping tradable certificate prices high, which increases 
the incentive for electricity retailers to pay the buyout fee instead of purchasing 
tradable certificates. Because buyout fee charges are recycled amongst complying 
electricity retailers that purchase tradable certificates, and because the retailers are 
also in many cases RES-E generators, it is argued they have a vested interest in 
restricting RES-E supply to increase the amount of buyout fee income that comes 
back to them. When combined with the fact that full attainment of each year’s RPS 
target would have caused the UK tradable certificate price to crash before the 
guaranteed headroom feature was introduced (discussed below), the recycling 
phenomenon is often credited with being the driving force behind the low 
attainment of UK annual RES-E targets, shown in Table 6. Whether the UK buyout 
fee is too low or too high depends on whether an electricity generator in the country 
is also an RES-E generator and it also depends on what type of RES-E is being 
considered. The combined value of the buyout fee and the amount recycled from the 
buyout fund acts can act as an RPS tradable certificate price ceiling if set too low, 
for 2008-09 it was £35.76 + £18.61 = £54.37. If an electricity retailer is also an 
RES-E generator, then the cost to it of generating wind, as shown in column 1 of 
Table 4, is less than this amount and it would be worth the retailer generating this 
type of RES-E instead of paying the buyout fee. This is also the case if a retailer is 
not a generator and has to buy RES-E tradable certificates on the open market. As 
shown in Table 7, in summer 2010-11, the cost of a UK tradable certificate was 
£52.20, again less than the effective £54.37 cost of the buyout fee. Similar 
calculations apply to biomass and offshore wind, after factoring in their multipliers 
as shown in Table 4. However, wave and solar PV are more expensive to generate 
than the effective value of the buyout fee, even after factoring in their multipliers, in 
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 which case the retailer would be better off paying the buyout fee, if it was also an 
RES-E generator.  
Table 6: UK RPS annual targets, attainment rates, buyout fee and recycled 
buyout fund amount, 2002-03 to 2008-09 
Year  RPS target: 
% of 
electricity 
generation 
RPS % 
achieved 
% of RPS 
target 
achieved 
Buyout 
fee: 
£/MWh 
Recycled 
buyout 
fund 
amount: 
£/MWh  
2002-03  3.0%  1.8% 60% £30.00 £15.94 
2003-04  4.3%  2.2% 51% £30.51 £22.92 
2004-05  4.9%  3.1% 63% £31.59 £13.66 
2005-06  5.5%  4.0% 73% £32.33 £10.21 
2006-07  6.7%  4.4% 66% £33.24 £16.04 
2007-08  7.9%  4.8% 62% £34.30 £18.65 
2008-09  9.1%  5.4% 59% £35.76 £18.61 
                               Source: Ofgem, (various); Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010b;  
Mitchell et al., 2011. 
 
The introduction of banding into the UK’s RPS has not been without its 
critics. Johnston et al (2008, pp. 2492, 2496) argue that banding will create 
‘regulatory and market uncertainty’ which may justify additional risk premiums for 
RES-E investors. They argue this is because future tradable certificate prices will 
depend on the degree to which different types of RES-E penetrate the RPS market. 
However, a device that the UK government has introduced which should minimise 
this tradable certificate price uncertainty is ‘guaranteed headroom’. This is a set 
percentage (currently 8%, rising to 10% from 2011) by which the RPS obligation on 
electricity retailers is increased each year above, and beyond, the number of tradable 
certificates expected to be created in the year. It ensures that the annual RPS 
obligation always keeps ahead of the expected level of RES-E generation which 
should keep an upward pressure on tradable certificate prices (Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, 2010a). Typically, a large (but variable) proportion of 
RES-E sold in an RPS is transacted via contracts between RES-E generators and 
electricity retailers. However, a significant proportion is typically sold via spot 
tradable certificate markets which influences contract prices. Table 7 shows UK 
tradable certificate market prices since its RPS began in 2002. It shows that, 
generally, prices have trended upwards but over the past three years have been more 
variable than they were in the previous three years, lending limited support to the 
argument of Johnston et al (2008). Between winter 2004/05 and winter 2007/08 
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 prices traded between a low of 4.03 p/kW-h and a high of 4.92 p/kW-h: a range 
equal to 22% of the low certificate price. However, between winter 2007/08 and 
winter 2010/11, prices traded between a low of 4.87 p/kW-h and a high of 6.68 
p/kW-h: a range equal to a higher 37% of the low certificate price.  
The presence of headroom does not remove all uncertainty in an RPS tradable 
certificate market because the amount of the headroom might change and there is no 
guarantee that it will always be used by the UK government. This means there will 
always be a justification for some risk premium, however it also has to be 
remembered that FIT subsidy rates can also be altered and therefore also carry a 
political risk, as argued by Finon (2006, p. 320).  
The headroom device provides an implicit tradable certificate price floor but it 
does not have to be linked to banding, it could just as easily be used in an RPS 
carve-out market. Some RPS countries have developed explicit RPS tradable 
certificate price floors; two such countries have been Belgium and Sweden. 
Belgium’s RPS is divided into three separate sub-national markets each of which 
has a minimum tradable certificate price below which prices are not allowed to fall 
(Coenraads et al 2008). In the case of Sweden, in order to develop early confidence 
in its RPS, a minimum tradable certificate price guarantee operated for an 
introductory period between 2003 and 2007 (Wang, 2006). The use of implicit, or 
explicit, RPS price floors, along with RPS carve-outs or banding, would give an 
RPS two of the key features that differentiate an FIT from an RPS: subsidy certainty 
along with differentiation of subsidy according to RPS type. 
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 Table 7: Tradable RPS certificate auction prices of the UK RPS (excluding the 
value of non RES-E electricity) since 2002 
RPS tradable certificate 
contract period 
Average RES-E 
tradable 
certificate price 
p/kWh 
Winter 2002/03 4.57 
Summer 2003 4.14 
Winter 2003/04 4.10 
Summer 2004 4.12 
Winter 2004/05 4.13 
Summer 2005 4.03 
Winter 2005/06 4.15 
Summer 2006 4.48 
Winter 2006/07 4.92 
Summer 2007 4.85 
Winter 2007/08 4.87 
Summer 2008 5.41 
Winter 2008/09 6.68 
Summer 2009 5.84 
Winter 2009/10 5.40 
Summer 2010 5.03 
Winter 2010/11 5.22 
Source: NFPAS Limited, 2010. 
 
4.2 The use of banding in Italy  
Another European country that uses the RPS mechanism, Italy, has also 
incorporated banding. However, as shown in Table 8, its banding rates are not 
highly differentiated, apart for wave/tidal and biomass (generators of less than 1 
MW capacity have the option of using an FIT for most of the RES-E types listed in 
Table 8). It seems, therefore, that Italy has not enthusiastically embraced the 
banding concept. This view is somewhat reinforced by the fact that it uses an FIT, 
and not an RPS band, to subsidise solar PV electricity irrespective of generator 
capacity as well as all small scaled RES-E generation from generators with less than 
1 MW capacity (Coenraads et al., 2008, p. 81; Rathmann et al, 2009, p. 139). As 
mentioned in s4.1, the UK also has an FIT for solar generation but it only applies to 
generators of 5 MW capacity or less. The use of an FIT for solar PV could reflect a 
belief that RPSs are ill suited for transitioning an RES-E type from a pre-
commercialisation stage to a supported commercialisation one, as argued by Foxon 
et al (2005, p. 2132). However, their argument did not anticipate the use of either 
banding or carve-outs in an RPS. If banding rates are not particularly generous, or if 
carve-out targets are not particularly ambitious, these devices may fail to help the 
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 transition to the supported commercialisation stage but if they are generous and 
ambitious enough, they could and FITs need not have a monopoly on this function. 
Table 8: Banding rates of RES-E types in Italy’s RPS 
RES-E type Tradeable certificate multiplier 
rates 
Onshore wind 1.0 
Offshore wind 1.1 
Geothermal 0.9 
Wave/tidal 1.8 
Hydro 1.0 
Biodegradable waste 1.3 
Biomass 1.8 
Biogas biomass 0.8 
Source: Rathmann et al., 2009, p. 139. 
Table 9 shows the generation of RES-E in Italy in 2008, when it introduced 
banding, and in 2009, the latest year for which data is available. As the table shows, 
solar PV experienced the largest increase in generation over the period but the 
increase was due to its FIT, not its banded RPS. Biomass, whose main form receives 
a higher tradable certificate multiplier than onshore and offshore wind, did not 
increase as much as wind over the period despite its multiplier advantage. Italy’s 
RES-E diversity index barely changed between the two years and its 2009 RES-E 
diversity was lower than the UK’s 2009-10 one (shown in Table 5) and lower than 
the 2008 diversity of US RPS states that use carve-outs (shown in Table 14). 
However, its commencing 2008 RES-E diversity was also lower than that of the UK 
in 2006-07 (shown in Table 5) and US carve-out states in 2003 (shown in Table 14). 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that banding is only used in a token way in 
Italy. 
Table 9: Change in RES-E generation in Italy since introduction of its RPS, 
2008 and 2009 
Technology 2008 generation: 
GWh/yr  
2009 generation: 
GWh/yr  
2008/2009 change: 
%  
Hydro 41,623 49,137 +18% 
Wind 4,861 6,543 +35% 
Biomass 5,966 7,631 +28% 
Solar photovoltaic 193 676 +250% 
Geothermal 5,520 5,342 -3% 
Total 58,163 69,329 +19% 
RES-E diversity index 1.86 1.89 +2% 
Source: Terna, 2010. 
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  Unlike most RPS jurisdictions, Italy does not have an explicit non-compliance 
penalty charge. If, after auditing, a retailer does not furnish the required number of 
tradable certificates, it is reported to the Regulatory Authority for Electricity and 
Gas which confers with its minister about appropriate sanctions. However, the 
legislation such sanctions are taken under is vague and undefined and there is 
therefore less of a compliance incentive in Italy than in most other RPS jurisdictions 
(Coenraads et al., 2008, p. 82; Rathmann et al., 2009, p. 138). 
5. The use of carve-outs in the USA 
The most significant use of the RPS carve-out device has occurred in the USA. 
The RPS is used by 25 of the 50 states in the USA, as well as by the District of 
Columbia. Out of the 26 RPS jurisdictions in the country, 11 use carve-outs within 
the mechanism. Details of the US RPS state carve-outs, as well as of the RPSs they 
sit within, are given in Table 10 (including Washington DC). 
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 Table 10: US state RPS commencement, RPS target and carve-out details, 2009 
State RPS 
commence-
ment year 
Overall RPS RES-E  target 
(% of all generation) 
Carve-out target and details 
Colorado 2004 20% by 2020 for private 
generators 
At least 4% of RES-E in all years must be solar (ie at 
least 0.8% of all generation by 2020) 
Connecticut 1998 23% by 2020 At least 3% of all generation by 2020 must be waste, pre 
1998 biomass and/or pre 2003 small hydro 
Delaware 2005 20% by 2019 At least 2.005% of all generation by 2019 must be solar 
PV 
Maine 2000 40% by 2017 At least 10% of all generation by 2017 must come from 
new RES-E 
Maryland 2004 20% by 2022 At least 2% of all generation by 2022 must be solar 
Nevada 1997 20% by 2015 At least 1% of all generation by 2015 must be solar 
New 
Hampshire 
2008 20.8% by 2022 At least 0.3% of all generation by 2025 must be solar, at 
least  6.5% of all generation by 2025 must be methane 
or small/medium biomass and at least 1% of all 
generation by 2025 must be small hydro 
New Jersey 1999 20.365% by 2019 At least 1.836% of all generation by 2019 must be solar  
New Mexico 2002 20% by 2020 for private 
generators 
 At least 5% of public generator generation by 2020 
must be wind, at least 5% of public generator generation 
by 2020 must be solar, and at least 0.6% of public 
generator generation by 2020 must be distributed 
North 
Carolina 
2007 12.5% by 2020 for private 
generators 
At least 0.2% of all generation by 2012 must be solar, at 
least 0.2% by 2021 must be swine waste, and at least 
900 TWh/yr by 2021 must be poultry waste 
Pennsylvania 2004 18% by 2020 At least 0.5% of all generation by 2020 must be solar, 
and at least 10% of all generation by 2020 must be 
waste coal, distributed generation, large hydro, 
municipal waste or gasified coal 
Washington 
DC 
2005 20% by 2020 2.5% by 2015 must be hydro or waste (declining to 0% 
by 2020) and at least 0.4% by 2020 must be solar. 
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2008. 
 
As shown in Table 10, in only four states do any of the carve-outs account for 
a significant proportion (at least a quarter) of their RPS target: Maine, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico and Pennsylvania. Even in those states, the carve-outs are 
not necessarily used to support high-cost RES-E. The largest Maine and 
Pennsylvania carve-outs are for fairly amorphous groups of RES-E (or even non-
RES-E): new RES-E in Maine, and waste/gasified coal, distributed generation, large 
hydro and municipal waste in Pennsylvania. In New Mexico (whose carve-outs start 
in 2011), one of its largest carve-outs is dedicated to wind, which is not a high-cost 
type of RES-E, and in New Hampshire its largest carve-out is devoted to 
small/medium biomass (including methane), which is also not a high-cost type of 
RES-E. This does not mean the carve-outs are superfluous, but it does mean they 
are not being used to support high-cost RES-E, and therefore to broaden the support 
of the RPS. In the other seven carve-out states, none has a carve-out for more than a 
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 quarter of its RPS target. Most of the Table 10 RPS states have carve-outs for solar, 
which is a high-cost type of RES-E, but few of them are particularly significant 
(with the exception of New Mexico’s solar carve-out for public generators). Nevada 
uniquely combines a carve-out with banding by awarding 2.4 tradable certificates 
for each unit of solar generation (with other RES-E types getting one) while having 
a solar carve-out that embraces 5% of its RPS target (Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 2010).  
Table 11: US state RPS carve-out commencement, carve-out cost cap and RPS 
exemption details, 2009 
State Carve-out 
commencement 
year 
Carve-out cost caps RPS retailer or customer 
exemptions 
Colorado 2007 Compliance cost capped at 2% of sales None 
Connecticut 2004 General penalty payment of $55/MWh None 
Delaware 2007 General alternative compliance payment of 
US$25/MWh (rising in future to 
US$80/MWh); solar alternative compliance 
payment of US$250/MWh (rising to 
US$350/MWh in future) 
Industrial customers with 
peak demand greater than 
1.5 MW and municipal 
and cooperative retailers  
Maine 2008 Alternative compliance payment of 
US$57.12/MWh plus inflation 
Contracted electricity and 
municipal or cooperative 
retailers 
Maryland 2006 General alternative compliance payment of 
US$15/MWh for Tier 2 through to 
US$45/MWh for solar carve-out, lower 
payments apply to industrial customers 
Customers with greater 
than 300 GWh/yr in sales, 
municipal and cooperative 
retailers 
Nevada 2005 None but utilities can be exempted if there 
is insufficient RES-E supply 
Municipal and 
cooperative retailers 
New Hampshire 2008 Alternative compliance payments for all 
carve-outs from US$28.72/MWh for class 3 
and 4 to US$153.54 for class 2 (adjusted for 
inflation) 
Some imported electricity 
and pre 2007 contracted 
supply exempted 
New Jersey 2001 Alternative compliance payment of 
US$50/MWh for general RES-E (declining 
in future) and US$711/MWh for solar 
carve-out of (declining in future years). 
Publicly owned retailers 
exempted 
New Mexico 2011 Compliance cost capped at 1% of sales in 
2006 rising to 2% in 2011. Alternative 
compliance payments by RES-E type from 
US$49/MWh for wind and hydro through to 
US$150/MWh for solar 
Municipal and privately 
owned retailers 
North Carolina 2010 Compliance cost to customers capped at 
US$10/yr for residential through to 
US$500/yr for industrial 
None 
Pennsylvania 2006 Non solar alternative compliance payment 
of US$45/certificate and for solar of 200% 
of recent average certificate price 
Municipal and 
cooperative generators 
and retailers with 
restructuring costs 
Washington DC 2007 Alternative compliance payments of 
US$10/MWh for Tier 2 through to 
US$80/MWh for solar carve-out 
Suppliers within and a 
building and purchasers 
of electricity for own use 
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2008. 
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 As shown in Table 11, all but two of the US carve-outs commenced in 2005 or 
later so, like banding in the UK and Italy, it is a relatively recent RPS refinement 
although it has a slightly longer history than banding in those two countries does. 
Table 11 also shows that nearly all US carve-out states have some form of 
alternative compliance payment, or cost capping provision, as well as some retailer 
or customer exemption. All could significantly erode the effectiveness of each 
state’s RPS in general as well as of its carve-outs in particular. However, it cannot 
be assumed that the alternative compliance payment provided for by a carve-out 
state is necessarily comparable to the current cost of its tradable certificates and 
therefore necessarily acts as a low to moderate ceiling on carve-out tradable 
certificate prices. If the alternative compliance payments for Connecticut, Maryland, 
New Jersey and Washington DC detailed in Table 11 are compared to the July 2008 
tradable certificate prices shown in Table 15, in all cases they are higher than the 
Table 15 certificate prices. 
 Unlike the enabling legislation for early, non carve-out RPS mechanisms, the 
RPS legislation for carve-out states generally emphasised the importance of 
electricity generation diversity. The legislation for the RPS mechanism of Delaware, 
New Hampshire and Washington DC, for instance, speaks of the desirability of 
increased electricity ‘supply’ or ‘fuel’ diversity while New Mexico’s talks about 
promoting ‘energy self-sufficiency’ (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2010).  
Table 12 shows the RES-E generation performance, between 2003 and 2008, 
of two of the four states with significant carve-outs: New Hampshire and 
Pennsylvania. As detailed in Table 10, New Hampshire’s most significant carve-out 
is for methane and small/medium biomass which Table 12 shows experienced 
significant growth between 2003 and 2008. New Hampshire also has a less 
significant carve-out for small hydro which the table also shows experienced 
significant growth over the period. Table 12 further indicates that, like New 
Hampshire, Pennsylvania’s greatest RES-E generation growth between 2003 and 
2008 occurred in a low-cost RES-E type, in its case wind. The RES-E generation 
experience of New Hampshire, in particular, demonstrates that carve-outs can be 
effective in supporting the growth of particular types of RES-E but, as previously 
stated, they are not being widely used in US RPS states to support high-cost types of 
RES-E. 
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 Table 12: RES-E generation change in New Hampshire and Pennsylvania,  
2003 and 2008 
RES-E type New 
Hampshire 
2003 
generation: 
GWh/yr  
New 
Hampshire 
2008 
generation: 
GWh/yr  
2003/2008 
change in 
New 
Hampshire 
generation  
Pennsylvania 
2003 
generation: 
GWh/yr  
Pennsylvania 
2008 
generation: 
GWh/yr  
2003/2008 
change in 
Pennsylvania 
Generation  
Geothermal 0 0  0 0  
Hydro 1,331 1,633 +23% 3,346 2,549 -24% 
Solar  0 0  0 0  
Wind 0 10  112 729 +551% 
Biomass 796 1,165 +46% 1,986 2,074 +4% 
Total RES-E 2,127 2,808 +32% 5,444 5,353 -2% 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2009 and 2010. 
 
Table 13 shows the aggregated change in RES-E generation between 2003 and 
2008 in US RPS states that do, and do not, use carve-outs. It confirms the 
contention that carve-outs are not being extensively used in US RPS states to 
support high-cost RES-E. It shows that the only types of RES-E whose generation 
grew significantly better over the period in the carve-out RPS states, compared to 
the non carve-out RPS states, were wind and geothermal. But wind is a low-cost 
type of RES-E so its growth is no testament to the potential for carve-outs to support 
high-cost types of RES-E. All the geothermal generation in carve-out RPS states 
between 2003 and 2008 took place in Nevada which does not have a dedicated 
carve-out for geothermal generation. 
Table 13: Changes in RES-E generation in US RPS states that do, and do not, 
use carve-outs, 2003 and 2008 
 2003 generation: 
GWh/yr 
2008 generation: 
GWh/yr 
2003/2008 change: 
% 
RPS states that use carve-outs: 
Hydro 19,929 16,292 -18% 
Wind 295 2,535 +759% 
Biomass 10,634 11,498 -8% 
Solar 0 161  
Geothermal 1,066 1,383 +30% 
Total RES-E 31,924 31,866 -1% 
RPS states that do not use carve-outs: 
Hydro 184,894 184,768 -1% 
Wind 8,699 39,843 +358% 
Biomass 15,185 15,620 +3% 
Solar 534 703 +32% 
Geothermal 13,975 13,228 +1% 
Total RES-E 223,287 254,162 +14% 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2009. 
Table 14, which shows the RES-E diversity indexes for US RPS states that do, 
and do not, use carve-outs for 2003 and 2008, reinforces the contention that carve-
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 outs have not been effectively used in the USA to support the full range of RES-E 
types. Table 14 shows that, although US RPS that do not use carve-outs had less 
diverse mixes of RES-E than RPS states that use carve-outs in both 2003 and 2008, 
between the two years the diversity in both sets of RPS states increased by similar 
proportions. There was therefore no obvious greater diversification increase taking 
place in US RPS carve-out states compared to non carve-out RPS states. 
Table 14: RES-E diversity indexes for US RPS states that do, and do not, use 
carve-outs, 2003 and 2008 
Type of RPS state 2003 diversity index 2008 diversity index 2003/2008 change 
Carve-out states 2.03 2.5 +23% 
Non carve-out states 1.42 1.79 +26% 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2010; author calculations. 
RPS tradable certificate prices, as at July 2008, for four US RPS carve-out 
states  Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey and Washington DC  are shown in 
Table 15. The table shows that carve-outs can cause significant variation in tradable 
certificate prices, even within a state. Carve-out tradable certificate prices are 
mainly influenced by the range of RES-E types that can be used within a carve-out 
and the medium term target for each carve-out. The spread in tradable certificate 
prices that carve-outs can cause is a disadvantage of the device as it introduces more 
complexity, and less liquidity, into an RPS tradable certificate market, as discussed 
below. 
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 Table 15: Prices of RPS tradable certificates in Connecticut, Maryland, New 
Jersey and Washington DC, July 2008 
State Tradable 
certificate 
class/tier 
RES-E types that qualify for 
class/tier 
Target for 
class/tier (% of 
electricity 
generation) 
Price of 
tradable 
certificates: 
US$/MWh 
Connecticut I solar, wind, biomass, ocean, post 
2003 small hydro 
20% by 2020 $25.00 
Connecticut II waste, pre 1998 biomass, pre 2003 
small hydro 
3% by 2020 $0.65 
Connecticut III combined heat and power, energy 
efficiency, heat recovery 
18% by 2022 $26.75 
Maryland 1 solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, 
ocean, fuel cell, pre 2004 small hydro 
18% by 2022 $1.00 
Maryland 2 other hydro, poultry biomass, waste 
energy 
2.5% by 2018 $0.60 
New Jersey I solar, wind, fuel cell, geothermal, 
ocean, biomass, waste 
16.029% by 
2019 
$17.50 
New Jersey II small hydro, waste 2.5% by 2019 
(can include 
class I) 
$0.60 
New Jersey Solar solar 1.836% by 
2019 
$265.00 
Washington DC 1 solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, 
ocean, fuel cells 
20% by 2020 $1.15 
Washington DC 2 hydro, waste 2.5% by 2015 $0.75 
Source: Evolution Markets, 2008; Union of Concerned Scientists, 2008. 
6. Strengths and weaknesses of banding and carve-outs 
The price-based banding device, and the quantity-based carve-out device, have 
strengths and weaknesses similar to any pair of price- and quantity-based control 
mechanisms as originally explored by Weitzman (1974) and recently reviewed for 
carbon pricing by Hepburn (2006). However, published literature, to date, has given 
the specific strengths and weaknesses of banding and carve-outs little attention.  
The strengths of banding are that its tradable certificate multiplier rates, and 
generation of particular RES-E types, can be flexible. It is relatively easy to make 
changes to its certificate multiplier rates (as the UK government did with its 
offshore wind rate in 2009 before banding commenced) resulting (probably) in 
different amounts of generation for the RES-E types the changes are applied to. 
However, such changes can increase risk, and therefore cost, and can also impact on 
other RES-E multiplier rates. Another strength of banding is that by retaining a 
single tradable certificate market, it retains a homogenous certificate market and 
therefore retains liquidity. A further strength is that it can remove over-subsidisation 
of low-cost RES-E types (although if carve-outs are created for each RES-E type, it 
too can achieve this). It can also be argued that governments can use banding 
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 multiplier rates to help drive reductions in RES-E generating costs. The weaknesses 
of banding are that it creates a relatively complex tradable certificate market and it 
delivers an uncertain amount of generation of particular RES-E types. Arguably, the 
setting of its certificate multiplier rates by governments, and not by markets, is 
another weakness (although markets determine the amount of generation that 
different multiplier rates result in). A further possible weakness can be that if 
banding sits within an RPS whose target is expressed as a number of tradable 
certificates, its certificate multipliers can, effectively, reduce the target. The UK 
government avoids this problem in its RPS target by factoring in the number of 
extra tradable certificates likely to be created by banding before adding on its 
‘headroom’ adjustment (already noted in section 4.1) (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change, 2010a). As long as the post-headroom total falls below the RPS 
ceiling (currently 20% of all UK electricity generation), then banding does not erode 
its target, although it could do so once the projected level of RPS tradable 
certificates gets near the ceiling. The potential erosion of RPS targets by banding 
certificate multipliers can also be overcome by expressing the target as an RES-E 
market share. Until 2009, the UK RPS obligation was expressed as a percentage of 
an electricity retailer’s sales but was changed, after the introduction of banding, to 
be a number of tradable certificates per 100 MWh of electricity sales. However, the 
UK retains an overall official RES-E market share target of 20% by 2020, as 
discussed in ss4.1. The use of banding makes the connection between this target and 
RES-E generation less certain although yearly market shares are still computed that 
show progress towards the target. 
The great strength of carve-outs is that they deliver (or should deliver) a fairly 
predictable amount of generation of particular RES-E types (if the size of each 
carve-out is realistic). Arguably, another strength is that it allows markets to set the 
differentials between its tradable certificate prices (although governments still 
determine the size of each carve-out). Its weaknesses are that, by creating a series of 
separate tradable certificate markets, it reduces the liquidity of the pre-existing 
homogenised market and, therefore, can be just as complex as banding. It can also 
be inflexible in the amount of generation it allows of particular RES-E types. A 
further weakness can be that once RES-E generation nears a carve-out target, the 
tradable certificate price for the type of RES-E in question can fall, creating a 
‘boom-bust’ environment. 
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  In theory, both the banding tradable certificate multiplier rates, and the size of 
individual carve-out markets, can be changed as market circumstances evolve, so 
those two flexibility weaknesses need not be serious for either device (although 
there is a limit to the frequency of change either can have before eroding RES-E 
investor confidence). Both also necessarily involve more complexity than 
undifferentiated, homogenised RPS tradable certificate markets so neither can claim 
to be inherently less complex than the other.  
When it comes to market or government determination of RES-E subsidies, in 
both cases, markets and governments together determine the total size of their RES-
E subsidies. This is because each controls either the per-unit subsidy rate, or the 
amount of RES-E generation. This means neither can claim to be more market- or 
government-driven than the other. However, it is important that the government 
component of each be linked to market realities. There is no point in creating very 
large carve-outs for RES-E types at embryonic stages of development and it is 
unwise to set banding multiplier rates that are conspicuously disconnected from the 
short and medium term generation costs of the RES-E types they are applied to. 
As discussed in section 3, a major theoretical strength of the RPS is its ability 
to contain static costs (Finon, 2006, p. 337; Menanteau, 2003, p. 807). It could be 
argued that because carve-outs preserve the one-to-one link between RES-E 
generation and tradable certificate creation, they retain this quality better than 
banding does and should, therefore, be able to deliver increased RES-E diversity at 
less cost than banding. However, if a target for a particular carve-out is set 
unrealistically high by a government, it will exert an upward force on tradable 
certificate prices and will not deliver diversity at least cost. This is also the case if a 
banding rate is made unrealistically generous for a type of RES-E. So both are 
capable of delivering expensive RES-E diversity if governments design them 
poorly. 
The significance of the reduction in market liquidity caused by carve-outs 
depends on the size of the pre-existing homogenised certificate market it is applied 
to (measured as the number of tradable certificates exchanged each year: a product 
of the RPS target size and the proportion met by open market certificate trading). In 
some RPS mechanisms, like that of Massachusetts, most generator income is 
derived from the open market sale of tradable certificates (Wiser et al., 2007). In 
others, such as Australia’s, only a small amount of RES-E is sold via the open 
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 market sale of tradable certificates (about 20% in its case) (McLennan Magasanik 
Associates, 2007, p. 18)) with the balance sold through contracts. Obviously, the 
larger the pre-existing open market for certificates, the less its division into separate 
carve-out markets matters. The potential for carve-out certificate prices to fall as 
carve-out limits are approached can be overcome only by increasing the size of the 
carve-out before this happens. 
There is, then, no clear design supremacy in either banding or carve-outs. 
However, on balance, the liquidity and generation flexibility strengths of banding 
probably make it superior to carve-outs, though either is capable of being 
incorporated into a specific RPS market. 
7. Conclusion 
The purpose of the banding and carve-out devices is to introduce different 
levels of support for different types of RES-E into the RPS mechanism so that high-
cost types, in particular, receive adequate support. To date, there is insufficient 
experience, and reliable data, to be able to reach definite conclusions about the 
effectiveness of either device in fulfilling this although there is ample information 
about the design differences between the two devices. Banding needs several more 
years of use in the UK before clear trends are evident. There also needs to be more 
significant use of carve-outs, in the USA or anywhere else, before any firm 
conclusions can be reached about its use. However, there is early, tentative evidence 
that banding is being effective at supporting high-cost offshore wind generation in 
the UK. There is also some evidence that carve-outs are being somewhat effective 
in supporting some low-cost types of RES-E in US RPS states but there is little 
evidence of high-cost RES-E support. In theory, both banding and carve-outs are 
capable of supporting high-cost RES-E. On balance, however, banding is probably a 
superior device to carve-outs although either could be incorporated into specific 
RPS markets. 
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